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1.0 Introduction 
 
In recent years new pragmatism has been an inspiration for organizations studies (see 
for example Van de Ven 1989, Clegg and Hardy 1996, Czarniawska 1997, 2003, 
Czarniawska and Sevón 1996, Wicks and Freeman 1998, Tsoukas & Knudsen 2003; 
Westwood and Clegg 2003). On an ontological and epistemological level 
pragmatism has offered a ‘third way’ to a discussion of whether organizational 
studies should be grounded in either a realist or a post-modern ontology. This debate 
has long been a central issue in Organizational Studies leading both to positions on 
paradigm incommensurability and arguments on the need to combine the paradigms, 
(Hassard 1990, Parker 1993, Reed 1993, Czarniawska 1998). It has also lead to 
positions arguing for a third way, such as critical realism (Reed 2005) or pragmatism 
(Wicks and Freemann 1998, Czarniawska 2003). The pragmatic response to 
paradigm incommensurability is to view the development of theoretical knowledge 
not as a war game (see for example Martin & Frost 1996), to be lost by the one ‘who 
bleeds first’ and won by the one who ‘stays longer on his (yes)? feet’ (Czarniwska 
2003a:257), but as a conversation (Van Maanen 1995:140, Weick 1999, Czarniawska 
2003, 2003a:257, Eisenberg 2000).  
 
The discussion of paradigms however remains largely at the level of ontology, 
epistemology and ethics, leaving questions on how to design and how to choose 
methodologies which accommodate a pragmatic ontological and epistemological 
perspective untouched. In this paper we would like to begin to address these 
questions by conceptualising various case study designs in organization studies from 
a pragmatic perspective. Pragmatism is thus not a stance from where the prime 
ambition is to discuss questions of ontology or ethics but as an epistemological 
stance from where we discuss implications for research design, methodology and the 
validity of scientific knowledge from a pragmatic perspective. This is not to advocate 
that epistemology exhausts ontology (Reed 2005) but to try to take the discussions 
further to a more operational level for social science research. Agreeing with Alfred 
Schütz that “It is impossible to understand human conduct by ignoring its intensions, 
and it is impossible to understand human intensions by ignoring the settings in which 
they make sense” (Schütz, 1973 from Czarniawska 1998a:4), case study designs are 
chosen as they allow for recognition of the contextual factors and settings in which 
organizational behaviour unfolds (Yin 1994). In this paper we will focus on 
qualitative case study designs. 
 
The central question we address is the implications a pragmatic perspective has for 
the way we generate and develop our theoretical as well as empirical understanding 
of organizations and organizational phenomena using case study designs. Our main 
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argument is that a pragmatic perspective is applicable to the following types of case 
study designs: a non-theoretical, a theory generative and a theory interpretive case 
study design, as well as a design aiming at developing existing theories. Our second 
argument is that the implications a pragmatic perspective has for how we conduct 
scientific inquiry in the various designs may not be that different from more 
conventional perspectives on case study designs. In what follows we firstly present 
the pragmatic perspective applied in the paper, secondly we discuss the implications 
a pragmatic perspective has for the four types of case study designs, listed above and 
thirdly we discuss some of the implications a pragmatic perspective has for 
validating the knowledge generated in the various case study designs.  
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2.0 The New Pragmatism and some Ontological and Epistemological Reflections  
 
“We pragmatists take the same dim view of Absolute Truth and of Reality as It Is in 
Itself as the Enlightenment took of Divine Wrath and Divine Judgement.” (Rorty 
1998:76) 
 
Before turning to the question of how to design case studies from a pragmatic 
perspective we briefly address some ontological and epistemological issues, as they 
influence the question of how to generate valid knowledge and hence also influence 
the question of how to design research studies. As Richard Rorty has been one of the 
major sources of new pragmatic inspiration within organization studies (see for 
example Tsoukas & Knudsen 2003a, Chia 2003; Czarniwska 1997, 2003, 2003a 
Keleman & Hassard 2003, Weick 2006) the following discussion of how to represent 
reality and the role of theory takes its starting point in Rorty’s reflections on these 
issues.    
 
As indicated in the introductory quote, new pragmatism as formulated by Rorty 
abandons the idea that the purpose of scientific knowledge is to strive for 
correspondence with the world as it truly is (Gimmler 2005:78). In fact the very idea 
of truth is absurd: “It is absurd, either as the notion of truth about reality which is 
not about reality-under-a-certain-description, or as the notion of truth about reality 
under some privileged description which makes all other descriptions unnecessary 
because it is commensurable with each of them.” (Rorty 1979:378). This leads 
however not to a stance of post modern relativism, where the idea of the reality is 
replaced by an idea of “…discursive constructions and cultural forms that have no 
ontological status or epistemological significance beyond their textually created and 
mediated existence…” (Reed 2005:1622). In other words, in a post-modernist sense, 
is taking the pragmatic perspective that the world is not out there, but merely 
reproduced in the language-games in which we engage (Rorty 1989), or is it to make 
the distinction “…between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that 
truth is out there” (Rorty 1989:4-5).  
 
This absurd view of representations of reality as it truly is, is also implied in the 
acceptance of the contingent character of knowledge of, in our case, organizations: 
“To accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance from, and 
our conversations with, our fellow humans as our only source of guidance.” (Rorty 
1982:166). As Czarniawska quoting Rorty describes it: “In Rorty’s view, there are 
no a priori or universal criteria; all there is is a temporary and localized agreement 
in a “scholar community” about what is “good”, “functional”, or “beautiful” 
(Rorty 1987, 1992b)” (Czarniawska 1997:56). Thus Rorty argues for a philosophy 
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which takes a step away from thinking towards practice and actions by asking not 
whether a scientific description of a given, in this case phenomena, in organizations 
is true, but whether it works and proves to be of a certain use within the context in 
which it is formulated and ascribed a meaning (Pedersen & Tjalve 2000:45-46).  
 
In such a perspective the aim of generating scientific and theoretical descriptions and 
explanations is not correspondence or the discovery of empirical phenomena’s 
essence, but to engage in conversations on the good or functional aspects of a given 
theoretical statement (Rorty 1979:378). In this sense the social realty, including the 
social scientific reality, is essentially a social accomplishment. 
 
Representing the scientific community and the development of scientific and thus 
theoretical knowledge as a conversation however requires not only ‘talking’ but also 
‘listening,’ in spite of the fact that these conversations often take place in multi-
paradigmatic sites. As Weick argues, reflecting on the development (Weick 1996) 
and the paradigmatic differences (Weick 1999) within organization studies, 
organizational theorists should drop their ‘heavy tools’: “If theorists drop their heavy 
tools of paradigms and monologues, they still have their intuitions, feelings, stories, 
experiences, awe, vocabulary and empathy. Most of all, they still have their capacity 
for attentive listening” (Weick 1999:804). 
 
A central medium for scientific conversations is theories; however, as we have 
abandoned the criteria of correspondence, the question to be discussed in 
conversations of theories is not one of whether they are true or false. As stated by 
Mintzberg: “It is important to realize, at the outset, that all theories are false. They 
are after all, just words and symbols on pieces of paper, about the reality they 
purport to describe; they are not that reality. So they simplify it.” (Mintzberg 
2005:356). This means that theories are not discoveries of causal relations in the 
reality as it is, but creations (Mintzberg 2005:357), representations (Weick 
1989:529), or enactments (Weick 2005:405). As pragmatism neither regards 
theoretical accounts and interpretations of organizational structures, processes and 
behaviour as merely reflections of an objective reality (Wicks and Freeman 1998), 
nor argues that there is no stance from where we as either researchers or practitioners 
can privilege some accounts, they (we) need a criteria of a good theory which is not 
‘merely’ empirical testing and the identification of causal relations (Donaldson 
2003).  
 
As a ‘third way’, recognizing that there are multiple ways to describe, engage in 
conversations of and interpret in this case organizational phenomena, pragmatist’s 
point to a criteria of usefulness (Weick 1989, Mintzberg 2005:356). This criteria 
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“…remind people that they can and should see different interpretations as having 
more or less value (i.e., better or worse), depending on their ability to serve given 
purpose and enable people to accomplish relevant goals.” (Wicks & Freeman 
1998:134). The criteria of usefulness is both seen as a epistemological criteria which 
raises questions of the credibility and reliability of knowledge as well as a normative 
criteria which raises questions of the usefulness of knowledge in terms of its ability 
to accomplish goals, develop theory etc. (Wicks & Freeman 1998:130). The 
normative criteria further imply that scientific knowledge does not and should not 
have a privileged position. Science is thus merely one way of representing parts of 
the reality in which we engage (Wicks & Freeman 1998:126-127). The criterion of 
usefulness within a scientific community implies however, not that anything goes, 
but in stead that the criterion of usefulness becomes a question of whether our 
theoretical arguments, models etc. are considered plausible (Weick 1989) or 
legitimate by the interpretative community (Czarniawska 1997:201) or the networks 
of critical debates, conversations and narrative traditions, which constitutes the field 
of organization studies (Reed 1996:51, Czarniawska 1997:200-201, Wicks & 
Freeman 1998:132). 
 
Thus, privileged or not, scientific knowledge is a distinct way of generating 
knowledge of, in this case, organizations, and why the questions of usefulness and 
plausibility within the scientific conversations are linked to questions of the quality 
of our research designs. In what follows, we turn to discussing the practical 
implications the various case study designs have for generating scientific knowledge 
from a pragmatic perspective.  
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3.0 What is as case?  
 
We now turn to our argument that a pragmatic perspective is applicable to the 
following four types of case designs: The non-theoretical, the theory generative, the 
theory interpretive case study design as well as the design aiming at developing 
existing theories. Before giving an introductory description of the differences 
between the various case designs we briefly reflect on the question: what is a case? 
 
Looking at the case study literature you will find numerous answers to the question 
of what a case is and the discussion seems complex. The problem with these many 
different answers is that they all have implications for research practices and results 
when working with case studies as a research strategy (Ragin 1992:8); however, it is 
a commonly held conception that case studies are preoccupied with the unique.   
 
The use of the term ‘case’ raises yet another question: “When researchers speak of 
generality…A case implies a family; it alleges that the particular is a case of 
something else. Implicit in the idea of a case is a claim…if (researchers) say that they 
have presented ‘only a case’ the term itself reveals greater ambitions. Cases are 
always hypotheses” (Walton 1992:121-122).  
  
No matter what a case is a case of, the case’s selection represents a hypothesis stating 
that a case represents a more general or a special, extreme or unique phenomenon. In 
practice the researcher does not, a priori, consider what a phenomenon is a case of, 
but it can become a goal in it self to disclose a generalised connection of what a 
phenomenon is a case of. 
 
To the question of what a phenomenon is a case of, there is no unambiguous answer 
(Antoft 2005). A case can be seen as an example of many different empirical and 
theoretical universes depending on what part of the organizational life we place our 
research focus on (Andersen 1997). As a consequence we see cases as examples of 
analytical and social constructions and cases should not be considered as anything 
else. This also counts for case studies designed to capture the unique, and controlled 
by an idea of understanding and explaining the ‘special case’, confronted in the 
research process. From this standpoint case studies are placed in a social world 
where the case or cases under study cannot be seen as separate from the surrounding 
world. Studying an organizational phenomenon as a case is only meaningful when 
the phenomenon is considered a part of a larger social reality and can be studied in 
this context. In short, the case study is conducted from either an empirical or a 
theoretical basis in a context where some sort of social organizing takes place, and at 
the same time the researcher will have some notion of a more general universe in 
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which the case in spite of its unique character represents more general social 
phenomenon.  
 
Since cases are not something that exists out there or can be discovered but should be 
viewed as constructions there will always be multiple possibilities and opportunities 
for defining a case no matter what agenda is guiding the research (Andersen 1997). A 
consequence of this perception of case studies is that cases can develop and change 
in character during the research process (Platt 1992:41), as well as in the presentation 
of and conversations regarding the results and conclusions drawn. In the end the 
audience can influence and change the case through their interpretations of oral and 
written presentations of the research results (Ragin 1992:8). 
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4.0 Case study designs and pragmatism 
 
What is the argument for conducting case studies in the first place? Of course there 
are a number of different answers to the question but for the sake of the overall 
argument in this paper we will focus on three reasons based on our pragmatic 
standpoint.  
 
The first argument relates to the issue of designing scientific inquiry. The choice of 
research strategy is often attached to the question of what problem is being studied. 
In this line of argumentation the empirical or theoretical problem solving is guiding 
the choice of research design, methods and data. With reference to Robert K. Yin we 
argue that the case study is a relevant research strategy when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon under study and its context do not appear clear and evident (Yin 
1994:13). However Barbara Czarniawska argues that Yin’s argument for using case 
studies do not contribute to a more precise answer since the boundary between a 
phenomenon and its context is never clearly evident (Czarniawska 1997:64). Taking 
this into account we must design our case studies from a slightly different rationale; 
case studies enable attention to the meaning of contextual conditions and highlight 
the boundary between a phenomenon and its context as a social construction often 
created by the researcher. 
 
In such a pragmatic perspective the second argument is closely related to the 
question of how we as researchers can construct such boundaries. The creation of 
boundaries is a process in which the researcher in conversation with the empirical 
material, existing theories, other researchers, practitioners and other actors 
(individuals, groups, organizations etc.) negotiate and construct these boundaries 
between the phenomenon and its context: “Here a case study is the study of 
development of a certain phenomenon. The process or focus is chosen by the 
researcher, and the time frame is beyond the decision of the researcher (a study can 
be terminated before the case is over; which does not terminate the case for other 
observers.) The span of the development of the case is negotiated between the 
researcher and the organizational actors (alive or documented)” (Czarniawska 
1997:65).  
 
To further grasp the (practical) process of defining a case-study, Czarniawska (1997) 
proposes the concept of window-studies. Window studies utilise both the negotiated 
character of the process of negotiating what the case-study is observing, and the 
often, methodologically set boundaries,. As well as the set boundaries,  case-studies 
always take their point of departure by ’breaking into’ a chain of organizational 
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events, actions, decisions etc, which resembles the processes of the socially 
constructed, reproduction of the organizational aspects we wish to study.  
 
A window study is defined as the point in which: “A researcher opens an arbitrary 
time window and describes all that can be seen through it. Here it is the processes 
that are negotiated with the actors: what is central, important, new, routine, and so 
on. A window study can turn into a case study (when the researcher decides to leave 
the window and follow the train of events), or into a series of mini-cases.” 
(Czarniwska 1997:65). 
 
This processional identification of boundaries between phenomena and context is a 
premise no matter what strategy is applied. However the boundaries are not just 
negotiated with other actors, but also through the researcher’s conversations with 
theories and empirical material. In the strategies presented in this article the 
researcher engages in a conversation with the empirical material in a qualitative 
manner; metaphorically speaking this dialog takes place as a ‘negotiation’ process. 
Most qualitative oriented researchers have been confronted with informant’s 
unexpected, yet enlightening answers. The informant dismisses the question as being 
irrelevant for the phenomenon under study, he or she points at several other 
contextual conditions being overlooked as the case is described by the interviewer or 
mentions that the context in which we study a certain phenomenon is too narrow, the 
historical perspective too short etc. The qualitative case study enables the negotiation 
or the conversation. In this conversation the researcher’s contribution can be 
described as a ‘novel reading’, which means an interpretation by a person 
(researcher) who is not socialized into a certain social organization/ context, and as a 
consequence is able to describe and perhaps explain an organizational phenomenon 
in a new, creative, but still recognizable manner (Czarniawska 2000:18). 
 
Finally, it is possible to use a moral argumentation for choosing qualitative case 
studies as a research strategy. From a pragmatic perspective, qualitative case studies 
always claim the need for a conversation between the researcher and the field of 
investigation – between researchers and practitioners- the researcher is thus morally 
obliged whilst constructing the boundary between phenomenon and context and also 
when drawing their conclusions about a certain phenomenon and its relation to the 
context in which it unfolds. Rorty (1982) writes that it would be a misinterpretation 
to view peoples’ reasoning as epistemologically privileged – in relation to the 
researcher’s status - as they try to justify their actions and cultures. However, it 
would not be a delusion to consider them more morally privileged. The point being, 
that we as researchers have an obligation to listen to peoples’ reasoning about their 
actions and include these in our scientific reflections. This is not because people 
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them selves hold the key to their motives of action, but because they are humans just 
like ‘us’ (Czarniawska 1997:4).1  Although it is rare to see research strategies based 
solely on a moral argument, it does not mean that moral reflections and arguments 
can be dismissed. This kind of argumentation could and should be part of our 
considerations on when and where it is both interesting and relevant to adopt a 
research strategy based on qualitative case studies.  
 
 
Regardless of what a case is a case of, and what argument we use for practicing case 
studies, one can choose among various case study designs. A conventional and 
introductory way to differentiate between the various case study designs is to 
differentiate according to whether their prime ambition is to generate new empirical 
or theoretical knowledge. The different case study designs such a differentiation 
gives are illustrated in figure 1:  
 
Figure 1: Different types of case study designs  
 Scientific 
inquiry starting 
from empirical 
knowledge  
Scientific 
inquiry starting 
from theoretical 
knowledge 
Purpose: to 
generate new 
empirical 
knowledge 
Non-theoretical 
case study 
designs  
Theory-
interpretive case 
study designs  
Purpose: to 
generate new 
theoretical 
knowledge  
Theory-
generating case 
study designs  
Theory-
developing case 
study designs  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This claim should not just be seen as an argument specific for qualitative case studies alone but as a 
more general argument for taking the others perspective into account in research. 
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An implication of the different initial ambitions in terms of the character of 
knowledge case studies produce is that the conversations the designs are 
contextualised as part of varies. That is, as we will return to when discussing validity, 
not to say that the results from the designs primarily aiming at developing theoretical 
knowledge are not to be used and evaluated in non-scientific conversations, but it is 
to say that there are different ‘rules of conversation’ to be considered in the various 
designs as well as different initial questions to be answered.   
 
4.1 The non-theoretical case study design 
 
The overall purpose of non-theoretical case studies is to generate new empirical 
knowledge. Putting it on the spot, non-theoretical case studies are concerned with an 
interest for special issues, occurrences, social groupings or communities, and seek 
elements from real life for representing and explaining the unique cases being study 
(Antoft 2005). Arend Lijphardt agues that non-theoretical case studies are descriptive 
and they exist in a theoretical vacuum. They are not guided by established or 
hypothetical generalizations nor are they motivated by a wish to create general 
hypothesises (Lijphardt 1971). In other words there are usually no theoretical 
ambitions setting the scene for designing and conducting these kinds of case studies.  
 
Looking at the case study literature there are two main arguments for working with 
non-theoretical case designs. In the first argument the main purpose, not just for 
organization case studies but also for sociological research in general, is uncovering 
the uniqueness of social systems and social processes through field work and with an 
emphasis on the actors’ subjective experiences (Becker 1970). The focus is on thick 
descriptions (see Geertz 1973) of social reality and social phenomena rather than on 
developing general concepts and theories; the researcher acts more or less as a 
media, and reflects a deeper understanding of the social reality being observed. The 
idea is to become one with the part of the reality, those events, actors, social 
groupings or communities under study, whilst at the same time letting the observed 
present themselves, and their interests in and views on, their social world (Andersen 
1997).  A second group of non-theoretical case studies are motivated by their 
relevance for a broader organizational, political, social and cultural frame of 
reference. This kind of case study is driven by an inherent societal engagement, 
where the phenomena under scrutiny is viewed as having a major impact on social 
life, and generates valuable and interesting knowledge (Andersen 1997). The Enron 
scandal, the genocide in Rwanda and the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre 
are good examples.  
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Whatever the argument for conducting non-theoretical case studies, they are all 
typically guided by societal engagement and they share a common purpose i.e. 
generating interesting empirical knowledge. In short this involves uncovering 
interesting and unique social phenomena or problems through empirical studies 
presented through ‘thick descriptions’.  
 
The purpose of generating empirical knowledge could also be seen as the basis for 
creating a platform for accomplishing goals or developing theory etc. Since the 
analysis of these unique cases makes it possible to generate empirical knowledge 
about organizational phenomena that would otherwise be unknown to us, they have 
the potential for being useful, not just for practitioners but also for scientific 
communities’ ambitions in terms of developing existing or constructing new 
theoretical knowledge. In other words it is implied that knowledge generated from 
non-theoretical case studies contributes to both stimulating action for practitioners 
and theory construction in scientific communities.  
 
Even though these types of case studies do not develop models or theories but ‘only’ 
have ambitions to uncover interesting and valuable empirical knowledge, in a 
pragmatic view the description is still an important part of any research process and 
the ambition of disclosing social conditions and constructing theories and models 
which can prove to be useful in future conversations about organizational phenomena 
on both a theoretical and a practical level. 
 
 
4.2 The theory interpretive case study design 
 
The theoretical interpretive case study design can be regarded as a ‘truly’ pragmatic 
case study design in the sense that the theories involved may be essentially chosen 
using as its starting point the question of the purpose at hand (Czarniawska 
1997:201). As illustrated in figure 1, the theoretical interpretive case study design’s 
initial purpose is to generate empirical knowledge, i.e. how can theoretical 
knowledge enhance our empirical understanding of a given case. The theory 
interpretive case study design has at the out set an inductive character. Often these 
designs are chosen on the grounds of an empirical puzzle and an interest in 
understanding and explaining an empirical incident or problem etc. In these designs 
various theories enable the researcher to contextualise the empirical incident in 
various ways which may not only give different descriptions and explanations of the 
empirical data, but also give different answers to the question of what this is a case 
study of. Although initially inductive, rather quickly, theories become a central 
element in the theory interpretive case study design as ‘the novel reading’ takes as its 
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point of departure existing theories, which help in defining the case, enables the 
collection and ordering of the empirical data (Selznick 1949:250), and identifying 
potential relations within the data gathered; in addition, existing theories are the 
grounds on which to discuss the uniqueness or general character of the empirical 
findings of the case.  
 
One of the most prominent case studies using a theory interpretive case study design 
is Graham Allison’s (1971) study of the Cuban missile crisis published in Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison begins his case study by pointing out that the 
conclusions of case studies are not only dependent on the empirical data available 
and gathered, but are also dependent on the theories used to interpret the empirical 
data: “When answering questions such as “Why did the Soviet Union place missiles 
in Cuba?” what we see and judge to be important and accept as adequate depends not 
only on the evidence available but also on the “conceptual lenses” through which we 
look at the evidence.” (Allison & Zelikow 2004:16). Hence a prime purpose of the 
case-study is thus to illustrate how different theoretical interpretations results in 
different explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
A theory interpretive case study design may, however, include not only a novel 
reading, but novel readings, as competing or supplementing theories often informs 
the case-study. Allison and Zelikow (2004) argue in this respect for competition as a 
criterion when choosing theories, as theories not only reflect, but also represent and 
thus simplify the empirical phenomena to be interpreted. In this process competing 
theories “…open minds a little wider and keep them open a little longer. Alternative 
conceptual frameworks are important not only for further insights into neglected 
dimensions of the underlying phenomenon. They are essential as a reminder of the 
distortions and limitations of whatever conceptual framework one employs.” (Allison 
& Zelikow 2004:21). From a pragmatic perspective, this may be the case if the 
purpose at hand is for example to show how a certain empirical event is caused, 
informed and /or explained by a multiplicity of logics, rationales etc. In addition to 
the criterion of competition, one finds a list of other selection criteria in the literature, 
for example the criterion of the simplest theory, or the most comprehensive theory 
which is able to describe or explain the largest part of the case (Andersen 1997:70). 
From a pragmatic perspective these criteria may or may not be of relevance, 
depending on the purpose at hand.  
 
4.3 The theory generating and theory developing case study design  
 
The main ambition of both the theory generating and theory developing case study 
design is the generation of theoretical knowledge. Although the former relies on an 
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inductive logic starting from the particular and the latter relies on an deductive logic 
starting from the general (Mintzberg 2005:357), the central question in the context of 
a pragmatic perspective for these designs is how can we generate and develop our 
theories for engaging in and contributing to future scientific conversations on 
organizational phenomena? From a pragmatic perspective that implies that the 
usefulness is not only a question of its practical implications for practitioners, but 
also for the research community with which we engage. When talking to other 
theorists the pragmatic criterion of usefulness becomes a question of the plausibility 
of a given theoretical statement (Weick 1989).  
 
In addressing these questions we turn to Karl Weick, who has had and still has a 
major ‘voice’ in not only conversations within the organizational field as such (see 
for example Organization Studies 2006), but also within the part of the field arguing 
from a pragmatic perspective (Van Maanen 1995, Wicks & Freeman 1998, Eisenberg 
2007). Weick himself was one of the first within organization theory to advocate the 
criteria of usefulness in his contribution to the special issue of Academy of 
Management Review in 1989 on the questions of what constitutes a good theory and 
how is the process of theorising to be improved (Van de Ven 1989). As stated in the 
introduction: “Theorist often write trivial theories because their process of theory 
construction is hemmed by methodological structures that favour validation rather 
than usefulness…” (Weick 1989:516). 
 
Before we elaborate this argument, we will shortly present the two types of case 
designs relevant for this discussion. Hereafter we describe the more general 
implications a pragmatic perspective has for theory generating and developing, and 
finally we turn to some more practical implications in terms of research design.  
 
The main purpose of the theory generating case design is to establish new theoretical 
knowledge based on empirical knowledge and data. This strategy enables the 
researcher to establish theoretical patterns through empirical observations, which 
cannot be intercepted through existing theories (Antoft & Salomonsen 2007). Put in a 
different way: the relevance of theory generating designs should be found in its 
ability to develop new concepts and theories through case studies, especially in 
research fields without existing theories at hand. 
 
In the grounded theory approach as developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss 
(1967) it is how we construct valid theoretical endings from empirical data that is the 
pivotal point.  The main focus in this line of theory construction lies in the process of 
generating theory from a general method for comparative analysis (Glaser & Strauss 
1967).  The starting point for constructing new concepts is not based on the 
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assumption that theory development only happens through deduction. However this 
does not mean that generating new concepts through empirical material is a pure 
inductive process. As Strauss writes: “Many people mistakenly refer to grounded 
theory as ‘inductive theory’ (Strauss 1990:12). More precisely it is the interplay 
between induction and deduction which makes possible the process of generating 
new theory. If you want to generate new concepts using a case study design the first 
step in the research process is to identify the key dimensions in the empirical 
material. The second step is to define concepts as configurations of the key 
dimensions identified earlier. Generating new concepts implicates some sort of a 
theoretical universe and the third step in the process is to test potential 
generalizations to other examples existing in this universe. As a result, the process of 
generating grounded theory is comparative in its form (Glaser & Strauss 1967). For 
Glaser and Strauss it is important to stress, that generating theory should follow 
certain methodological rules creating a systematic and transparent research process 
leading to new theories.  
 
Grounded theory produces new theoretical knowledge on two different levels: 
substantive and formal theory. Substantive theory is developed for an empirical field 
of investigation. It is theory with a direct reference to the described phenomena, such 
as patient care, relations between professions, crime, and negotiations etc. Formal 
theory, however, is theory developed for a conceptual field of investigation. Rather 
than using words from people that are being studied, this level of theory is attached 
to scientific terms such as stigma, formal organization, socialization, authority and 
power etc. Both substantial and formal theories have ‘middle-range’ character. As a 
consequence these theories, when fully developed, can be placed in between what 
Robert K. Merton describes as minor working hypothesises about peoples everyday 
life and all-embracing ‘grand theories’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:32-33). 
 
As mentioned above this approach is basically comparative in its form. Constructing 
new theory demands verification and falsification of the concepts generated from the 
observations of the organizational phenomenon. A single case can be sufficient for 
creating a notion of a concept, but the concept cannot be verified and its 
representative validity evaluated until it has been compared to other cases.         
 
Theory generation case studies’ contribution to generalizations through developing 
concepts is recognized. This is also the case when discussing studies not based on the 
logic of grounded theory. A number of classical studies are also based on detailed 
empirical investigations and these studies lead to what can be considered strong 
formal conceptualizations (Andersen 1997).  Michel Croziers (1964) study the 
Bureaucratic Phenomenon is a classic example from organizational studies. In his 
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research Crozier analysed of the machine operators in the tobacco industry in France, 
which were viewed as bureaucratic organizations. Early in the research process 
Crozier discovered an interesting trait of these employees, they seemed to be 
complaining a lot, and in a way which made it impossible to explain within a 
bureaucratic theoretical framework focussing on the subordinates in placement in the 
formal organizational hierarchy.   
 
The machine workers insisted on keeping their special skills out of formal working 
procedures and written manuals. By performing what Maw Weber describes as social 
closure and restricting access to knowledge about how they practice their work, the 
workers could use the organization’s weaknesses to block production and as a 
consequence challenge their superior’s authority. This process was the starting point 
for a trade union tactic attempting to increase the worker’s salaries and status in the 
organization. In this case study, Crozier demonstrated how French culture 
interplayed within a bureaucratic system, but more interesting at the same time he 
disclosed how control within strategic points in a bureaucracy play a key role in 
realising political agendas. 
 
Developing new concepts presumes an ability to develop typologies and to 
reformulate insights in a theoretical vocabulary (Andersen 1997). The starting point 
for Crozier was the exercise of power by excluding others from skills vital for the 
organization. This led to a more general argument demonstrating the relationship 
between organizational status and control over central sources of uncertainty. Today, 
this conceptual model is still relevant for studies on differences in power and status 
in organizational life (Andersen 1997).   
 
These examples of conceptualizations are all generalizations capturing in a dense 
matter crucial organizational phenomena. Through many years of challenging, these 
conceptions have gone through a process of further development and coupling with 
other conceptions, and have proved to be everlasting and still play a key role in 
organizational studies. How then can we explain the durability of these conceptions?  
One possible explanation is the grounding in empirical data. It is tempting to assume 
that it is the conceptualizations and the theory construction’s foundation in the 
empirical reality that seems to have made them more useful as tools for even 
contemporary organizational analysis. What we should not forget is that this 
development has happened not just through empirical testing but also through 
continuous conversations in research communities about their usefulness as general 
conceptions and theories. In this sense there is a certain pragmatic element in the 
process of generating new theory from empirical knowledge. 
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Looking at theory developing case designs, Weick (1995) suggests that theory and 
theory development is not adequately conceptualised as a product, but as a process of 
theorising. In other word, our struggles with not only generating, but also testing and 
developing theories will never end – and should never end (Weick 2005:395). The 
need for conceptualising the development of theory as a process and not a product is 
grounded in, as Rorty writes, a perspective on the world as unknowable due to its 
contingent and ever changing character. This is also reflected in organizations as  
 
“…organizing is the act of trying to hold things together by such means as text and 
conversation, justification, faith, mutual effort (heedful interrelation), transactive 
memory, resilience, vocabulary, and by seeing what we say in order to assign it to 
familiar categories. Efforts to hold it together are made necessary by interruptions 
such as regression, thoroughness, inconsistency, cosmology episodes, forgetting, the 
unexpected, threats, and disasters.” (Weick 2006:1732). 
 
The subject of our inquiries is thus constantly changing as it reproduces itself -why 
are our theories reflections on ‘yesterday’s organizations?’ (Weick 2005:410). 
Important questions in this respect are thus not how organizing constitutes a system 
of causally dependent elements but how organizations are able to hold themselves 
together, what that means, what the holding together depends on as well as in a more 
explanatory mode, “…when what it depends on happens…” (Weick 2006:1732). In 
order to theoretically reflect the complexities involved in organizing and move from 
theorising of yesterday’s organizations to theorising of the processes which 
reproduce the organization, researchers must stop making theories which only look 
and understand backwards, when the organizational life, according to Weick, quoting 
Kierkegaard, is lived and experienced forwards. “Living forward that is unsettled, 
emergent, and contingent contrasts sharply with our backward oriented theoretical 
propositions that depict that living as settled, causally connected, and coherent after-
the-fact.” (Weick 2006:1732).  
 
Understanding theory construction as a process of theorising is further reflected in 
Weicks view on the theoretical vocabulary we choose to describe the contingent 
character of organizational life as well as in his conceptualization of the 
epistemological challenges such a perspective poses. Regarding the former, Weick 
referring to Rorty argues, that “…vocabularies are tools for coping rather than tools 
for representation…” (Weick 2006:1725). That means that the central question for 
theory constructions and development becomes: “…what kinds of vocabularies foster 
faith, coping and better guessing? The answer, in science as in everyday life is that, if 
the goal is to compose useful vocabularies, then tests of usefulness lies in the 
outcomes of actions that take place in the presence of these vocabularies. The words 
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I struggle with seem to contribute to resilience. But if they don’t, if interruptions lead 
instead to further collapse rather than resilience, then we need to find a different set 
of words, a different way of saying so we see and think differently, and a different 
way to imagine more energetically”. (Weick 2006:1734).  
 
Turning to the latter, Weick introduces the evolutionary epistemology (Weick 
2004:659-660, 2005:395). The evolutionary epistemology is argued by comparing 
theorizing with sense making (Weick 2005). As sense making, theorising means that 
we conceptualise, understand and explain as we go along, that is that the way we are 
able to know the world is not fixed but constantly changing as we try to make 
models, hypotheses and concepts from the data we collect. An evolutionary 
epistemology is consistent with the pragmatic position, that ‘people do not hold on to 
their ontologies’ (Czarniawska 2003:133), which is why it is necessary to be 
epistemologically open-minded. But it is also consistent with the pragmatic position 
that theories of the reality are more a process of creation, achievement and 
enactment: “The ‘known facts’ and ‘empirical findings’ theories ‘explain’ can 
precede theory construction or follow it. The fact that theory construction is a form 
of retrospective sense making does not decouple it from facts. Rather, it means that 
facticity is often an achievement. Having first said something, theorists discover 
what they have been thinking about when they examine more closely what they said. 
A closer look at what they have said often suggests that it is about examples, 
experiences, and stories that had previously been understood though not articulated. 
What is said enacts facts because it makes understanding visible, explicit, and 
available for reflective thinking, but what has been said does not create the 
understanding; instead, it articulates the understanding by converting ‘know how’ 
into ‘know that’. (Weick 2005:405).  
 
Having described the more general implications a pragmatic perspective has for 
theory generating and developing, we now turn to some more practical implications 
in terms of research design.  
 
Firstly a pragmatic perspective entails that research designs allow researchers to get 
close to the subject of inquiry (Mintzberg 2005:365). As argued by Weick, “Any 
theorizing is dependent on the quality and extent of the details that ground it.” 
(Weick 2005:397). This means that the pragmatists argue for keeping the thick 
descriptions: “Authors of qualitative studies are often asked to drop much of the 
description of characters and events, so as to make room for greater theoretical 
development. The resulting description may end up as little more than a small 
sequence of vignettes or a summary table of quotations, illustrating those concepts or 
hypotheses formulated in a paper. Such paring can deplete a manuscript of much of 
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its value. Lost may be the rich description that Van Maanen (1989) said is necessary 
for researchers to build strong theory over time. Lost also may be the comprehensible 
events. Weick (1992:177) noted that much of his own work constitutes “knowledge 
growth by extension” which “occurs when a relatively full explanation of a small 
region is carried over to an explanation of an adjoining region.” (Sutton & Staw 
1995:383).  
 
Equally important is however the ability to ‘step back’ and reflect on empirical 
findings (Mintzberg 2005:365). The process of stepping back is however also 
affected by the perspective chosen at the out-set of one’s case study design. That is to 
say, stepping back from empirical findings in a realist perspective is, as will be 
demonstrated in the second implication, a quite different process from stepping back 
in a pragmatic perspective.  
 
A second practical implication of theory development as pragmatic theorising, 
confronts the perspective on theory development as a linear process of problem 
solving, which entails a sequential thinking as well as an implicit striving for solving 
the problem (Weick 1989). In- stead theorising emphasises the simultaneous parallel 
process which is often the main characteristic of generating and developing theory. 
This process is conceptualised as a disciplined imagination (Weick 1989) which, in 
accord with an evolutionary epistemology, prescribe “…an active role for researchers 
who construe theoretical representations, rather than seeing such theoretical 
representations as deductively or naturally following from problem statements… 
‘disciplined imagination’ is rooted in the view that ‘logic’ of scientific discovery, is 
psychological, that is, a matter of heuristics – and not just logical, that is, composed 
of deduction and predictions.” (Cornelissen 2006:1581).  
 
Disciplined imagining involves the following three components: problem statements, 
thoughts trials and selections criteria. Components which all lead to more plausible 
theories in the sense of being “…interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant or absurd, 
obvious in novel ways, a source of unexpected connections, high in narrative 
rationality, aesthetically pleasing, or correspondent with presumed realities.” (Weick 
1989:517). Disciplined imagining involves a set of practical reflections and rules of 
how to construct and develop theories for future conversations within the tradition of 
organizational studies.  
 
The first practical advice is to state problems with are likely to be solved by middle 
range theories or by models, hypothesizes etc. which are more steps towards theories 
than actual theoretical statements (Weick 1989:521). This advice is argued referring 
to the contingent and complex character of organizations which result in the premise 
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for social scientists that their problem statements often involves “…so many 
assumptions and such a mixtures of accuracy and inaccuracy that virtually all 
conjectures and all selection criteria remain plausible and nothing gets rejected or 
highlighted.” (Weick 1989:521).  
 
Secondly, researchers must increase the heterogeneity of the supposed outcomes – or 
the thought trials – involved in the research design and be careful when classifying 
how the different and, especially, the difference among the thought trials is 
empirically identifiable (Weick 1989:522). This process may be qualified using 
metaphorical imagination (Weick 1989, Cornellisen 2006). This process may involve 
deductive as well as inductive logic in which one turns to one’s own past experience 
and past theoretical conversations of the subject of one’s inquiry as well as to one’s 
own ‘tool of intuition’ (Cornelissen 2006:1582). Enhancing heterogeneity means 
increasing the potential outcomes and thus increasing richness but also the 
complexity in one’s theoretical metaphor, model, explanation etc. In other words the 
increase of heterogeneity involves a constant balance between remaining sensitive 
for the complexities potentially involved in one’s theoretical model, description, 
explanation etc. and being able to cope conceptually with these complexities.  
 
The third piece of advice regards when to stop and select the metaphor, model or 
explanation which one finds most plausible (Weick 1989). In this part of the process 
Weick (1989) introduces a number of selection criteria. This is interesting in the 
sense of triggering a re-evaluation of past theorising of the empirical subject, and 
thus potentially triggering a revision of that past theorising (Weick 1989:525). That 
this is obvious may at first sight be a disappointing reaction in the sense that no new 
meaning has been added, but this may lead to a question of obvious for whom? 
 
Thirdly arguing for theorising and not theory has some implications for the way we 
evaluate the theoretical contributions resulting from our case-research. Arguing for a 
strong theory is arguing for a strong or fixed reality, which from a pragmatic point of 
view is, as mentioned, absurd. Thus what we can do from a pragmatic perspective is 
to try and approximate our theories to the socially constructed and ever changing 
reality. However, our theories themselves often represent approximations of actual 
theories: “The process of theorizing consists of activities like abstracting, 
generalizing, relating, selecting, explaining, synthesizing, and idealizing. These 
ongoing activities intermittently spin out reference lists, data, lists of variables, 
diagrams, and lists of hypotheses. Those emergent products summarize progress, 
give direction, and serve as place markers. They have vestiges of theory but are not 
themselves theories. Then again, few things are fully fledged theories.” (Weick 
1995:389). 
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 This view may be judged as being negative, but arguing from a pragmatic stance, 
that theory construction and development is more adequately described as theorising 
results, in a more positive judgement where researchers need not be apologetic, but 
merely honest. To argue for a process based conception of theory is however also in 
line with conventional descriptions of theory development to argue for ways to 
increase the robustness of the theory work: “If prior and subsequent steps in 
theorizing are merely more of the same – diagrams precede this paper, and diagrams 
will be the focus of the next paper – then theorizing is less robust and promising than 
if people are moving from one of the five through a second of the five, on to a third 
of the five.” (Weick 1995:389).  
 
Fourthly, and as already indicated, development of theories according to criteria of 
usefulness and plausibility involves also more ‘mundane’ or conventional designs, 
which aim at identifying the ability of theories to generalize, “…we need to find out, 
if not that not any particular theory is false (since all are), at least how, why, when 
and where it works best, compared to other theories.” (Mintzberg 2005:357).  
 
In accordance with a pragmatic perspective on science as conversation, DiMaggio 
points out that although being engaged in scientific work may often be a lonesome 
process, the conversational character of the scientific community implies that the 
theory construction is not an individualistic, but a collective or at least highly social 
constructive process. The process of developing and constructing theories does not 
end when the research is published. A “…theory’s fate will be determined in part by 
factors outside one’s control. If the production of good theory requires the utmost 
care, theory’s reception is ordinarily helter-skelter: a process of appropriation 
driven more by resonance than by reason, in which complex arguments are reduced 
to slogans and related to one another along binary dimensions more redolent of 
Levi-Strauss’s tribal cultures than of gradated theory classes.” (DiMaggio 
1995:394). A central premise of theory development in a pragmatic perspective is 
therefore, that “…one must trust in the free association…” (Weick 2004:657), and 
accept that theorists may control the input in the contemporary and future scientific 
conversations, but they can not control the outcome (Weick 2005:409). 
 
A well know case-study which illustrates several of the points described above is 
Phillip Selznicks (1949) TVA and the Grassroots. Firstly reading the case-study one 
is presented with an abductive reasoning, which of course may not represent the 
development of the theoretical concepts involved. Secondly, at the time of the case 
study, one of the main theoretical accomplishments was its conceptualization of how 
organizations may respond to their environments by incorporating them as part of the 
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organization, what Selznick defines as cooptering. However as part of the case-
study, Selznick pointed to the way formal organizational structures in time become 
infused with values (Selznick 1949); a point that was later taken up by the 
sociological new institutionalists as a major inspiration for their development of how 
organizations become institutionalised (see for example DiMaiggio & Powell 1991).  
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5.0 Pragmatic case study designs and the question of validity 
 
In this section we discuss the implication a pragmatic perspective has for how we can 
validate our empirical findings and theories, our research findings and discuss the 
questions of how do we validate our knowledge. We have already touched upon the 
question of how to validate our knowledge within the scientific community, arguing 
that the criterion of validity becomes a question of whether it is useful for the 
purpose at hand. Although the purpose at hand varies in general the purpose of the 
various case study designs can be described as how to generate useful empirical thick 
descriptions in the non-theoretical case study design, novel readings in the theory-
interpretive case study design and plausible models and theories in the theory 
generating and developing case study designs.  
 
The validity of our scientific accounts is however not only judged within scientific 
communities, but also by the organizational actors, which are the subject of our 
inquiries, as well as other actors outside the scientific community. In this part we 
discuss whether and how these judgments can be used as a criterion of validity per se 
and as a criterion of validity within the scientific field.  
 
Given the pragmatic position that theoretical knowledge should be valued according 
to its practical relevance, respondent validation becomes central. This is caused by 
the pragmatic perspective on the status of science as neither morally privileged, nor 
closer to the idea of some sort of truth compared to other descriptions. In other 
words, researchers have an obligation to include the accounts and judgements given 
by the subjects of our scientific investigation. The accounts given from actors within 
and actors from without the scientific conversations are however not given and 
justified by the same standards or logics: “If we see knowing not as having an 
essence, to be described by scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current 
standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the 
ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts from 
the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry to the relation 
between alternative standards of justification...” (Rorty 1979:389-390). 
 
In other words do the standards from which actors make judgments of whether a 
scientific account is interesting, obvious, connected, believable, beautiful, or real, 
differ. This calls for awareness of the premises or standards laid by actors outside the 
scientific communities when judging the validity or the usefulness of the scientific 
accounts. What may be useful from a practice perspective is not necessary the same 
as from a scientific perspective. For example what is interesting from a practitioner’s 
point of view indicates that we have been able to do a novel reading in the sense of 
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adding a new perspective on their actions and their reasons etc. which is produced in 
the organizations we study. When theories are involved, often this novelty lies in the 
researcher’s ability to see the general and or the unique elements of the specific 
context or the relationship between various aspects of the organizational context and 
or its environment. This may however cause an opposite reaction within the scientific 
community: the reading may not be that novel in the sense of not adding new 
theoretical insight. The judgements may also be affected by organizational politics. 
As argued by Weick: “Theorists can imagine as well as select realities that merely 
serve the interests of powerful organizational actors and not be aware that this is 
happening. It is a thin line from that is interesting to that is in my best interest, from 
that is obvious to that is what managers want to hear, and from that is real to that is 
the power system.” (Weick 1989:528).  
 
Thus a central challenge facing theorists is thus to make explicit which and who’s 
interests may be in play. These premises are out of the researcher’s control, and are 
thus literally premises which one can only take into account when including 
respondent validation. This is, however, not the case when it comes to reflections on 
which research designs and methodologies respondent validation makes most sense 
when argued as a strategy of validation. It is obvious that case study designs 
primarily aiming at description and producing empirical knowledge may be more 
readily validated by laypersons than those primarily aiming at explaining and 
generating or developing theories. However, given the pragmatic perspective, all four 
types of case study designs may produce knowledge which to some extent can be 
validated outside the scientific community. Thinking more practically, one way of 
practicing respondent validation is to construct thick descriptions from the often 
detailed empirical material as a form of narrative which laypersons (and the scientific 
community) can respond to and comment on whether this representation of 
organizational life is meaningful and or useful to them. To facilitate this process we 
as researchers must create descriptions, which is thick enough in conveying ‘The 
devil in the detail’ (kilde) so to speak, and at the same time make the descriptions 
specific enough to point at central dimensions in the representations without loosing 
central elements in the overall narrative. 
   
Thus whether a description is ‘thick enough’ or whether a theoretical interpretation 
represents a novel and useful reading of a given empirical case is to a large extent 
negotiable with the actors who are the subject of our inquiries. Regarding the former, 
descriptions are never specific enough, but they may become thick enough. 
Regarding the latter, when we ask respondents to judge what is a useful 
interpretation or a novel reading we ask – is this knowledge of any use for you and 
your organization, but we additionally ask whether they are able to recognize our 
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representation as well as whether our representations add a novel perspective on their 
conception of their (organizational) reality.  
 
When it comes to questions of whether our models, theories etc. represent plausible 
representations of the reality, is however, not only for laymen to decide. This is 
firstly caused by the fact that theories are representations which simplify and model 
the reality as experience by the organizational actors as well as by the researcher – 
they do not reflect the reality as it is. This is as mentioned an ontological premise 
within the pragmatic perspective. But it is also a practical circumstance, which has 
implications for the usefulness of laymen’s perceptions in the process of validating 
ones models or theories. The problem is whether the organizational actors are able to 
fully comprehend our theoretical representations of their experienced reality, since 
these representations does not necessarily present empirical thick descriptions relying 
heavily on the experiences and perceptions of the actors. As a consequence we must 
also turn to our scientific communities to validate our more simplified and perhaps 
abstract representations of organizational life. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction we stated, that the main arguments posed in the article as follows: 
a pragmatic perspective is applicable to the four types of case-designs and the 
implications a pragmatic perspective has for how we conduct scientific inquiry in the 
various designs may not be that different from more conventional perspectives on 
case-designs. 
 
Having elaborated the former in the discussions above we now turn to the latter. To 
begin we do not wish to argue that there are any differences between conventional 
case-designs arguing for example from a realist perspective. However the difficulties 
involved in conducting case-designs may not be that different. The strength of the 
pragmatic perspective is, we argue, that it not only puts focus on, but also makes 
substantial methodological contributions, by pointing out the epistemological 
implications the practical difficulties and challenges involved in conducting scientific 
inquiries.  
 
In case studies a pragmatic perspective puts focus on theory generating, development 
and interpretation as a practical process, which involves as much contingency, 
ambiguity and retrospective reasoning and justification as sense making processes in 
ordinary life do. However, it also points to ways in which we can perhaps not solve, 
but cope with the complexities these practical problems represent inherent in the 
process of generating, developing and interpreting theories and empirical findings.  
 
Conducting case studies from a pragmatic perspective, the purpose of our scientific 
inquiries is put up front. The questions of what is the purpose of our inquiries and for 
which (political) reasons do we conduct this line of research should be explicated in 
our representation in a way which make it possible for others to see how these 
questions are answered and reflected in our case designs. This kind of pragmatic 
reflections puts focus not just on the handicraft but also on the political and moral 
implications of our scientific endeavours.  
 
If we look at some of the differences between conventional and pragmatic designs it 
is not a question of how to conduct a case study as it is a question of what to make of 
our case study and how to validate it. But the main difference is to be found in the 
process of validating ones case studies. To define the conventional way of validation 
qualitative case studies is however quite difficult. Reading the literature on 
qualitative research you will find an unambiguous field of understandings pointing at 
different ways of validating qualitative inquiry  and this is no different when 
focussing qualitative case study research. There is no doubt that the more 
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conventional ways of validating down plays the role of respondent validation in 
favour of for instance a classical data triangulation (Riis 2006). However we see 
respondent validation as a key to create scientific knowledge using case designs not 
just because the respondent should have a morally privileged status but because they 
as organizational actors can evaluate the relevance of the research being done. 
Validating in terms of relevance is not just done through conversations with the 
organizational actors but also with the scientific communities. Testing ones analysis 
through conversations with colleagues does not in it self stand out from the more 
conventional ways of validating qualitative case studies, but it is still an important 
process of validating our simplified representations of the new theoretical and/or 
empirical knowledge.    
 
Finally we argue that the choice for methodologies for our case-designs are not a 
priori legitimized in the idea that ”different methods appropriate to the natures of 
different objects…” (Czarniawska 2003:129), but are legitimized in considerations 
on “…which vocabulary suits the purpose of my inquiry best?” (Czarniawska 
2003:129). Thus we find a methodology based on a pragmativ logic as best suiting 
our purpose – designing qualitative case studies. 
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